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Abstract 
The Internet has been population, which it was implement information technology, to every enterprise, also changed 
their contact mode of information flow style. Since public key conception was proposed, it had authentication 
function to secure while they are communication, and defense the data to leak based on stranger. In this article, we 
improved the Kwon-Song protocol that it avoids password guessing attack. 
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1. Introduction 
Kwon and Song proposed a scheme of generalize key agreement and password authentication protocol, 
based on constraint status; they presented a condensed variant of original protocol with fewer steps in 
2000 [3]. Yeh et al. [4] showed that the enhanced version of the generalized key agreement and password 
authentication protocol while it is insecure against the off-line password guessing attacks. Ku et al. [2] 
proposed a reflection attack and gave an improvement for original protocol. We improved an enhanced 
protocol to resist guessing attack. In Section 2, we briefly review and discussion the Kwon-Song protocol. 
In Section , we analyzed Yeh et al. attack method. We gave an improvement for their protocol in section 
4. Section 5 is our conclusion. 
2. Review of Kwon-Song Scheme 
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2.1 Kwon-Song’s Original Version 
In this paper, we denote Client Alice and Server Bob while we call A and B. Alice (A) and Bob (B) are 
assumed to share the weak passwords in their safety way. It could be shared off-line or by any other 
secure channel. They agree upon a generator of g and its group *pZ . Let parameter , ,x lD  and y are 
selected in [2, p í 2] for a uniform distribution, and h1( ), h2( ), h3( ), with h4( ) are kind of random 
oracles hash function. They communicate to run as following protocol. Alice wants to agree on a secure 
channel that chooses two random integers , xD  while it had computes and sends the data to Bob (1). 
Step 1. 
1 ( , ): || || x h s gA B A g g
DD o                               (1) 
Bob fetches s of A from his local secure storage. He also selects two random integer l  and y  gets 
1 1( , ) ( , )
4 4(( ) ) ( )
x h s g yh s gy xyK h g g h g
D D                    (2) 
and computes 
y lsg gD                                                  (3) 
when he sends the plaintext (4) to Alice before. 
Step 2. 
: || y lsA B l g gDm                                       (4) 
Alice is able to compute 
4 4(( ) ( ) ) ( )
y ls x xls xyK h g g h gD D                         (5) 
and gets 
2 ( , )h g K
D                                              (6) 
when she sends the message (7) to Bob before. 
Step 3. 
2: ( , )A B h g K
Do                                      (7) 
Bob authenticates Alice and replies with 
3( , 1)h l K                                              (8) 
while he computes h2() and h2ƍ () made by himself if they match each other. 
Step 4. 
3: ( , 1)A B h l Km                                      (9) 
Alice gets h3() with h3ƍ () and compares each other, if they also match, then she authenticates Bob. For 
a result, they are agreement on a new session key in this communication 
2.2 Kwon-Song’s Enhanced Version 
In favor of constrained environments, Kwon-Song [3] in addition presents a condensed variant of their 
original protocol to reduce one step by sharing another generatorK , The scheme is force Bob to choose 
K , another generator of the same cyclic group also to g . 
Note that ( mod )ag pK  where gcd( , 1) 1a p    for *pZ or gcd( , ) 1a p   for its 
q order subgroup. Bob is also to get K  readily by raising g to a . Also note that there are a number of 
generators in the group, for example, ( 1 )pI  for *pZ  where ( )I  indicates that Euler totient 
function. The reduced protocol is summarized as follows: 
          1 ( , )1 . : || x h s gReduced a A B g
DDK o                                 (10) 
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 22 . : || || ( , )
y lsReduced a A B l g h KD DK Km                          (11) 
33 . : ( , 1)Reduced a A B h l Ko                                     (12) 
3. Yet et al. Attack 
Yeh et al. focus on the enhanced version and pointed out that it suffers from the off-line password 
guessing attacks. They assume that Eve attempts to impersonate Alice and try to cheat Bob. Eve chooses 
a guessed password 's  and two random integers D and x .Then she computes the 
message 1( ', )|| x h s gg
DDK  and sends it to Bob. 
1 ( ', ): || x h s gEve B g
DDK o                                           (13) 
2: || || ( , )
y lsEve B l g h KD DK Km                                     (14) 
Bob fetches the password s  of A from her secure local storage when he receiving the transmitted 
message later. He selects two random integers ( , )l y  who is computes y lsg DK and sends the message 
(14) to Eve when she gets 1 1( ', ) ( , )4 (( ) )
x h s g yh s gyK h g g
D D   after Eve store message (13) and 
message (14) locally and then executes the offline password guessing attack. Firstly, Eve guesses one 
password "s  and gets "y lsR g DK since D  is chosen by Eve and l  is a plaintext data. Then, Eve 
computes 1 1( ', ) ( ", )4' ( )
x h s g h s gK h R
D D  and computes 2 ( , )h K
DK with 2 ( , ' )h K
DK .If they match each 
other, then Eve guesses right the password. If they do not match, the Eve guess an others password until 
she hit the nail on the head off-line. 
4. Our Improvement 
Now, we consider a more general situation in which the weak secret s could be guessed. 
 
1 ( , )1 . : ||
sx h s gsReduced a A B g
DDK
o                             (15) 
22 . : || || ( , )
y ls sReduced a A B l g h KD DK K m                       (16) 
If Eve a passive attack, the information given by the oracle are as follows; A , 
sDK  , 1 ( , )
sx h s gg
D , l , y lsg DK , 2 ( , )
sh KDK  , 3 ( , 1)h l K   If she guessed 's , then she finds 
1 1( , ) ( ', )' ( )
s sh s h sx xg g g g
D DK K {  and ' )( )( )y y ls lsg g D DK K { . But, she has to solve the Diffie-Hellman 
problem for finding K . This situation is negligible equal to or less than 
1
2k
of probability. 
Definition 1. Discrete logarithm problem (DLP) 
Discrete logarithm problem ( , , )DLP p g y  is a problem that on input a prime p  and 
integers *, pg y Z , outputs 1pZD  satisfying (mod )y g p
D{  if such anD exists. Otherwise, it 
outputs ĵ.
  The above function, which outputs ĵ if there is no solution to the query, should be expressed as DLP 
and the notation DLP should be used only for a weaker function such that nothing is specified for the 
behaviour of the function in the case when there is no solution to the query [1]. We say, if Eve try to 
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guess the exponentialD , it is very difficult. On the other hand, those sDK  , 1 ( , )
sh s gxg g
D
, y lsg DK and l  
reside in the cycle group and the random oracle 1( , )
sh s DK  , 2 ( , )
sh KDK  ,and 3( , 1)h l K   are in 
( ){ 0,1}l k , there is no way to find the relationship between the rejected password and the remained 
password. 
5. Conclusion 
Here we improved a revision of Kwon-Song enhanced scheme. Whatever Bob or Alice, they could 
identify the impersonator will be failure while apocryphal offensive on session revised 1a and 2a. Our 
method can resist yet et al.’s impersonate attack. 
Acknowledgment 
The authors would like to thank the reviewers for their comments that help improve the manuscript. 
This research is partially supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No. 
61103247, and supported by the Department of Education of Fujian Province funding under the type B 
funding number JB09244. This research was supported in part by the Fuqing Branch of Fujian Normal 
University of China under the contract number KY2010-030. 
References  
[1] Chisato KONOMA, Masahiro MAMBO, and Hiroki SHIZUYA. Complexity analysis of the cryptographic primitive 
problems through square-root exponent discrete mathematics and its applications. IEICE transactions on fundamentals of 
electronics, communications and computer sciences, May 2004 
[2] Wei-Chi KU, Hui-Lung LEE, and Chien-Ming CHEN.  Reflection attack on a generalized key agreement and 
password authentication protocol. IEICE transactions on communications, 87(5):1386–1388, May 2004. 
[3] Taekyoung KWON and Jooseok SONG. A study on the generalized key agreement and password authentication 
protocol. IEICE transactions on communications, 83(9):2044–2050, September 2000. 
[4] Her-Tyan Yeh, Hung-Min Sun, and Tzonelih Hwang.  Security analysis of the generalized key agreement and 
password authentication protocol. IEEE Communications Letters, 5(11):462–463, November 2001. 
